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Abstract 
Game theory is a powerful tool for the disciplined 
analysis of interacting choices. Nevertheless, its use 
in empirical research is considered questionable since 
the standard assumptions of mathematical game theory 
seem to place exceedingly high information costs on 
real-life actors as well as on researchers. The paper 
tries to show that these misgivings are largely unjus-
tified. If players were in fact ignorant about each 
other's strategies and payoffs, they could either 
resort to generalized caution, or they could endoge-
nously create preconditions for trustworthy communica-
tion in an iterated "truth game" that is embedded in 
ongoing interactions. Furthermore, actors and re-
searchers alike are able to use standardized expecta-
tions derived from institutional rules and social 
norms for their orientation. As a consequence, the 
information costs of interactions are sufficiently 
reduced for players as well as for researchers to make 
game-theoretical explanations a feasible and promising 
proposition. 
* * * * * 
Trotz ihrer hohen Leistungsfahigkeit bei der Analyse 
interdependenter Entscheidungen gilt die Spieltheorie 
weithin als empirisch unanwendbar, weil ihre inforrna-
tionellen Anf orderungen anscheinend weder von realen 
"Spielern" noch von der empirischen Forschung erflillt 
werden konnen. Der Aufsatz versucht diese Bedenken zu 
entkraften. Bei Ungewi~heit Uber die Optionen und 
Praf erenzen der Partner konnten Spieler sich entweder 
auf risikominirnierende Strategien beschranken, oder 
sie konnten die Voraussetzungen flir glaubhaf te Kommu-
nikationen in einem (iterierten und vernetzten) "Wahr-
heitsspiel" endogenisieren. Darliber hinaus konnen 
sowohl die Spieler als auch die empirische Forschung 
sich an standardisierten Erwartungen orientieren, die 
durch Institutionen und soziale Normen begrlindet wer-
den. Wenn diese Moglichkei ten vorausgesetzt und ge-
nutzt werden, vermindern sich die Informationskosten 
spieltheoretischer Analysen so weit, da~ empirische 
Anwendungen rnoglich und aussichtsreich werden. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the social sciences as much as in the natural sci-
ences, our aspiration is to explain much with little. 
Yet all too often we are forced to choose between 
parsimonious theoretical models that do not seem to 
explain much at all, and more complete explanations 
that are barely less information-rich than historio-
graphic accounts - and equally useless for prediction 
(Peterson 1970). In this predicament, many social 
scientists have turned to the rational-choice paradigm 
in the hope that it might do for sociology and politi-
cal science what it apparently has done for economics 
- to generate an axiomatic-deductive theoretical sys-
tem whose propositions are capable of producing parsi-
monious and nonobvious explanations and predictions of 
real-world phenomena (Lindenberg 1983; 1989). 
1. The Challenge of Rational Choice 
What we have not always realized, however, is the vast 
distance between the generic form of the rational-
choice paradigm (Elster 1986) and its use in standard 
economics. In order to explain behavioral regularities 
as rational choices, it is not enough to know the 
decision environment and its reaction functions, but 
we must also know the subjective perceptions and pref-
erences of actors. And as the generic form of the 
paradigm has nothing to say about the formation of 
subjectivities, these must be treated as exogenous 
data in each individual instance - with the conse-
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quence that rational-choice explanations must have · 
truly discouraging information requirements. 
By contrast, the ability of economics to employ its 
impressive apparatus of applied mathematics for the 
production of nonobvious conclusions rests entirely on 
the reduction of these information requirements 
through a battery of simplifying and standardizing 
"auxiliary factual assumptions" (Simon 1986: S212; see 
also Simon 1978). Foremost among these are the postu-
lates that actors have unbounded rationality, that 
their perceptions are true representations of objec-
tive reality, that they will maximize an integrated 
utility function, and that this utility increases 
monotonically (but at a decreasing marginal rate) with 
the quantities of material goods, services and money 
obtained (Lindenberg 1989: 181). From an empirical 
perspective, these are heroic assumptions. And yet, as 
Ronald Heiner (1983) has argued, even they could not 
assure the predictive usefulness of micro-economic 
theory. If omniscient rational optimizers should in 
fact respond without friction to all environmental 
perturbations, ex-post explanations would still re-
quire a complete account of the total decision envi-
ronment, and prediction would be out of the question. 
Thus, Heiner concludes, any claim for the predictive 
power of economic theory must also presuppose behav-
ioral regularities reflecting bounded, rather than 
perfect, rationality and rule-based behavior. 
Yet if that is so in the economic heartland of the 
rational-choice paradigm, why should the rush to colo-
nize the territories of adjacent social-science disci-
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plines continue? And why should social scientists who 
are fully aware of all Simonian objections neverthe-
less defend the rational-choice paradigm on the 
grounds that "one can't beat something with nothing?" 1 
One reason must surely be the macho appeal of being 
able to work with complex mathematical models. Another 
seems to be the lack of generality of alternative 
explanations. Even if it is granted that complete 
rationality is impossible, one cannot assert that any 
specific instance of bounded rationality could never 
be overcome by additional search efforts and learning. 2 
Even more important, from my own point of view, is the 
experience that, in empirical research, we will often 
be able to obtain a reasonably good understanding of 
the options, world views and preferences of particular 
actors, or even of classes of actors in given types of 
1 
"Why has satisficing theory not replaced neo-
classical economics? The answer lies in a disturbing 
element of ad-hoc-ness in the notion of satisficing. 
The theory does not offer an answer to the crucial 
question of why people have the aspiration or satis-
faction levels they have ... These levels must simply 
be taken as given, which means that the theory offers 
little more than 'thick description' . Neoclassical 
theory will be dethroned if and when satisf icing theo-
ry and psychology join forces to produce a simple and 
robust explanation of aspiration levels, or sociologi-
cal theory comes up with a simple and robust theory of 
the relation between social norms and instrumental 
rationality. Until this happens, the continued domi-
nance of neoclassical theory is ensured by the fact 
that one can't beat something with nothing." (Elster 
1986: 26-27). For similar responses to the challenge 
of bounded rationality, see Przeworski (1986) and 
Tsebelis (1988a: Chap. 2). 
2 By the same token, bounded-rationality explana-
tions will often turn into self-defeating prophecies 
when they are communicated to the actors ( Binmore 
1987: 33). 
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situations. When that is so, explanations based on the 
demonstration that a particular course of action was 
the best one available to actors under given circum-
stances have a degree of persuasiveness and conclu-
siveness unmatched by alternative theoretical models. 
While institutionalist or functionalist explanations 
can always be challenged by asking why actors should 
have obeyed the assumed imperatives, it may be possi-
ble to question the factual premises, but not the 
conclusions, of rational-choice explanations. In their 
explanatory logic at least, they seem to fully satisfy 
our desire for Weberian Verstehen. And once we have 
reached that point, it is indeed tempting to restate 
this understanding in an analytical model that not 
only will be available as a heuristic for the explana-
tion of choices in similar situations, but that will 
also facilitate the discovery of nonobvious implica-
tions of the present interaction. 
But in order to be useful for empirical research, such 
models must in fact allow for valid representations of 
the understanding that we have gained. Thus, economic 
theory with its reliance on anonymous price mechanisms 
for the explanation and aggregation of individual 
choices may provide useful models for many types of 
large-number phenomena (e.g. migrations) even outside 
of the economy, while game theory seems to be more 
promising for the analysis of interactions among small 
numbers of individual or corporate actors who are 
aware of the interdependence of their choices. In my 
own work, which is mainly concerned with the influence 
of institutional arrangements on public policy, I have 
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used such models for explaining failures of macro-
economic policy coordination between national govern-
ments, central banks and labor unions (Scharpf 1987), 
and the emergence of inefficient constitutional ar-
rangements in German federalism and the European Com-
munity (Scharpf 1988; 1989a). In the present article, 
I will explore in a more abstract fashion the condi-
tions under which game-theoretical analyses could be 
useful in institution-oriented empirical research. 
2. The Elusive Promise of Game Theory 
Like all other types of formal modelling, 
theoretical representation of interactions 
obvious advantage that 
the game-
has the 
"the critical role of assumptions is laid bare. In 
the ideal, all such assumptions must be made ex-
plicit and then carefully examined from the view-
point of their realism in terms of "real-world" 
phenomena the model is intended to represent" (Bla-
lock 1989: 450). 
In my own experience, the importance of this advantage 
cannot be stressed enough, and game theory in particu-
lar is invaluable for the discipline it imposes on 
speculative hypothesizing about actors' interests, 
their available options, and the likely consequences 
of alternative strategies. 
More specifically, what game theory adds to the usual 
agenda of institutional research is, first, a more 
systematic focus on the interaction among multiple 
actors with interdependent choices (rather than on the 
strategies of an idealized unitary "policy maker"). It 
is thus able to deal with the fact that many outcomes 
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are not under the full control of a single actor, and 
that the actual consequences of human action are often 
not desired by their authors. Rather than treating all 
of these as failures of rationality, a game-theoreti-
cal approach suggests that many of them could be ex-
plained as the anticipated (and hence intended even if 
undesired) outcomes of choices under conditions of 
mutual or multiple interdependence. 
The second important contribution to institutional 
research is the concept of an equilibrium solution. By 
contrast to equilibrium analysis in economics, howev-
er, there are no implications of social optimality 
here. Game-theoretical equilibria are exclusively 
defined by the criterion that no player should be able 
to improve her present position by unilaterally chang-
ing her present strategy. In fact, one of the impor-
tant uses of game analysis is precisely the identif i-
cation of equilibria that are "social traps" with 
suboptimal outcomes for all participants. 
For empirical research, it is also important that 
there are games that have either no equilibrium solu-
tion at all, or that have more (sometimes many more) 
than one equilibrium. Thus game-theoretical analyses 
may lead to three kinds of empirically relevant con-
clusions: In games with a single equilibrium, it will 
be possible to explain, as well as to predict, the 
outcome that rational actors are likely to converge 
upon. In games with multiple equilibria, the set of 
possible outcomes can be identified, while the choice 
of a specific solution will be path-dependent (permit-
ting only historical explanations). Nevertheless, game 
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analysis will be able to explain the stability of the 
outcome that was in fact chosen (David 1985). If there 
is no equilibrium solution, finally, game theory will 
only be able to identify the reasons for the indeter-
minacy and instability of outcomes. But even that is, 
of course, a most useful contribution to our under-
standing of real-world situations. 
Less obvious, but even more important, is the ease 
with which available social science knowledge can be 
integrated into game-theoretical models. The opening 
is provided by the concept of "rules of the game" 
which is used to construct the payoff matrices that 
can then be subjected to game-theoretical analysis. In 
mathematical game theory, of course, these rules are 
stipulated rather than empirically determined - which 
explains the sense of unrealism and naivety with which 
many empirically oriented social scientists respond to 
game-theoretical exercises. But once the need for 
their empirical determination is acknowledged (as it 
must be in empirical applications), the perspective is 
reversed. Unlike neoclassical economics, which has 
developed its own "auxiliary factual assumptions" that 
are for practical purposes impervious to empirical 
information generated by psychological, sociological 
or even economic research, game-theoretical applica-
tions are completely dependent on exogenous informa-
tion. Thus, the empirically empty but formally precise 
concept of "rules of the game" becomes a perfect tem-
plate for translating available social-science knowl-
edge about real-world actors, institutions and power 
relationships into parameters of a game-theoretical 
model that facilitates analytical solutions. 
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These are attractive promises for theory-oriented 
empirical research. Yet before we get carried away, we 
must remind ourselves that game theory, even more so 
than standard economics, has developed into a branch 
of applied mathematics that works with analytical 
procedures whose empirical referents are of no concern 
to the theoretician. In their quest for identifying 
(unique) equilibrium solutions for all types of game 
constellations, game theorists have in fact developed 
high-powered solution algorithms that are hardly ac-
cessible to actors in real-world interactions. But 
since all such solutions must ultimately be imputed to 
the rational calculations of the players themselves, 3 
this creates a problem for empirical applications that 
does not arise in quite the same way in economics. 
3 That is not true of evolutionary game theory 
as it has been applied in biology and was then re-
transferred into the social sciences. It dispenses 
with the assumption of actor rationality by treating 
"strategies" as genetically fixed behavioral traits of 
biological species or as otherwise "hardwired'' (May-
nard Smith 1982; Axelrod 1984). If it is assumed that 
a rigorous selection mechanism will permit only the 
survival of traits with superior "fitness'', the out-
come, at the level of populations, will be identical 
with what could have been predicted on the basis of 
rational-choice assumptions. 
But the success of evolutionary game theory in 
biology depends on hardwired strategies - which are 
difficult to square with assumptions of purposeful 
human action (however boundedly rational) and of 
learning, even if routines and "standard operating 
procedures" are important in many areas of (mainly 
organizational) decision making (Hannan/ Freeman 1977; 
1984; Nelson/ Winter 1982). It also depends on the 
presence of a rigorous selection mechanism at the 
level of populations. Unless precise social analogues 
to both conditions can be identified, the specific 
explanatory potential of evolutionary game theory 
cannot be legitimately invoked in empirical social-
science research. 
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There, individuals are assumed to play a one- person 
game against nature where the opponent has no objec-
tives and no known strategies (Latsis 1972: 210-11), 
while the powerful analytical algorithms are of con-
cern only to the analyst who is trying to model the 
" invisible hand " that aggregates individual choices 
(Ullmann-Margalit 1978). In empirical applications of 
game theory, by contrast, the direct correspondence 
between the mental operations that are used by the 
analyst, and those that are imputed to the actors, 
forces us to work with only a subset of the analytical 
procedures developed by mathematical game theorists. 
We must, in other words, disable all elements of the 
analytical machinery that could not plausibly be used 
by real-life players if we intend to create valid 
explanations of empirical interactions. 4 
4 Foremost among these, in my view, are solution 
concepts relying on "mixed strategies" in single-shot 
games. Analytically, the use of mixed strategies is 
attractive because it assures that all zero-sum and 
finite non-zero-sum games will have at least one equi-
librium solution. But the notion that players should 
resort to a randomized mixture of their pure strate-
gies is highly counterintuitive, or even meaningless, 
in non-iterated games (Neisser 1952), and it is in 
fact not used by subjects, even in long iterations of 
experimental games where its application would have 
been profitable (Colman 1982: 77). 
Of course, by ignoring mixed strategies in analyses 
of empirical interactions, we also increase the number 
of situations for which game theory will be unable to 
identify a unique, or any, equilibrium solution. By 
the same token, empirical work will perhaps not profit 
much from recent advances toward a "general theory of 
equilibrium selection" that uses extremely sophisti-
cated solution algorithms to identify unique equilib-
ria in constellations where hitherto only multiple 
equilibrium points could be identified (Harsanyi/ 
Selten 1988). But what we lose in analytical power, we 
p r obably gain in greater realism. 
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Yet even if that necessity is accepted, it is unclear 
under what conditions actors could have the informa-
tion that they are supposed to have in game-theoreti-
cal analyses, and whether the information costs for 
researchers could be sufficiently reduced to make 
empirical applications practicable. These are diffi-
cult problems. Yet contrary to a widespread prejudice 
among empirically oriented social scientists as well 
as among mathematical game theorists, it is by no 
means a foregone conclusion that adequate solutions 
cannot be found, if not generally, then at least for 
certain kinds of situations. And given the potential 
explanatory power of game models, it seems highly 
worthwhile to explore the conditions under which one 
might have good reasons to use them in social-science 
research. 
Of the particularly vexing problems that arise in 
empirical applications of rational-choice (as distin-
guished from evolutionary) 5 game theory, the present 
5 See above, footnote 4. What seems more promis-
ing than evolutionary models are quasi-evolutionary or 
"game-learning theories" (Selten 1985: 83; Witt 1986) 
that relax, but do not eliminate, the assumptions of 
actor rationality. One might assume, for instance, 
that even if strategies are selected by trial and er-
ror, actors will be able to distinguish between more 
and less satisfactory outcomes. Thus, actors could 
reach at least local optima (Hernes 1976), and one 
could explain "lock-ins" (David 1985) or "joint-deci-
sion traps" (Scharpf 1988; 1989a) as game-theoretical 
equilibria even if actors did not, or could not, cal-
culate their optimal responses in advance. But such 
explanations presuppose ongoing interactions in envi-
ronments whose rate of change is slow compared to the 
actors' rate of learning. By contrast, the present pa-
per will explore the realism of game-theoretical anal-
ysis based on more stringent rationality requirements. 
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paper will examine conditions under which players 
might have sufficient information to anticipate each 
other's choices of strategy. In a subsequent paper, I 
intend to discuss the conne.ctedness among games and 
the conditions under which players might be able to 
cope with the potentially overwhelming complexity of 
multi-actor networks of interaction. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COMPLETE INFORMATION 
At the most basic level, game-theoretical solutions 
are derived from two types of postulates which John 
Harsanyi ( 1977: 116-118) has labeled "payoff domi-
nance" and "rational expectations." While the first 
set specifies that players will pref er outcomes maxi-
mizing their own payof f s, postulates of the second 
type explicate the notion that players should choose 
their moves in anticipation of the moves of other 
players who are also rationally maximizing their own 
payoffs. It is this second set of postulates that 
constitutes the specific analytical power of game 
theory, as distinguished from single-actor decision 
theory. It implies "empathy" - i.e. the ability to 
correctly analyze the interaction situation from the 
other players' point of view as well as from one's 
own. 
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1. The implications of information deficits 
In classical game theory, the ability to analyze the 
interaction situation from other players' points of 
view is assured by the postulate of complete informa-
tion, which implies that the strategy options and pay-
offs of every player should be "common knowledge" 
among all players. In empirical applications, that 
means that actors would need to know each other's 
action resources and constraints in order to arrive at 
a mutual understanding of their respective sets of 
strategies. They would also need to estimate the caus-
al consequences of all combinations of strategies in 
order to determine the physical outcomes obtainable. 
And they would need to know each other's perceptions 
and subjective valuations of these outcomes in order 
to construct the "payoff matrices" which could finally 
be subjected to game-theoretical analysis. For real-
life actors, these are demanding requirements indeed, 
whose lack of realism is - perhaps too readily -
granted by leading game theorists: 
"Classical game theory cannot handle games with 
incomplete information at all. . . This obviously 
poses a very serious limitation since virtually all 
real-life game situations involve incomplete infor-
mation. In particular, it very rarely happens that 
the participants of any real-life social situation 
have full information about each other's payoff 
functions. Uncertainty about the strategies avail-
able to the other players is also quite common. " 
(Harsanyi/ Selten 1988: 10) 
In other words, "classical game theory" would be inap-
plicable in practically all "real-life social situa-
tions . " In order to overcome these limitations, John 
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Harsanyi (1967/68) has proposed a "Bayesian" solution 
concept that replaces uncertainty with players' sub-
jective probability estimates of all elements of the 
game about which they are ignorant. In effect, this 
solution concept will transform games with incomplete 
information into games with "imperfect information "6 
that can be analytically handled by classical game 
theory (Selten 1982). But while the analytical validi-
ty of this ingenious solution is generally accepted, 
its applicability to "real-life social situations" 
remains very much in doubt. In fact, from an empirical 
point of view, the cure may be worse than the disease. 
It replaces unrealistic assumptions about actors' 
access to information with equally unrealistic demands 
on their computational capabilities (Eichhorn 1982; 
Colman 1982: 23-24; Friedman 1986: 116), and on their 
willingness and ability to use probabilistic solution 
concepts. Thus it seems fair to conclude that 
"Bayesian rationality has its place in normative 
theory but a more realistic approach should be 
developed for descriptive purposes" (Selten 1985: 
8 2) . 
It seems unlikely, however, that a "more realistic 
approach" could arise entirely, or even primarily, 
from innovations in mathematical game theory. We would 
gain more, I think, from an examination of the type of 
real-life situations to which (a subset of) the avail-
6 While "completeness" refers to information 
about payoffs and strategies, "perfectness" character-
izes information available at any point in a game 
about prior moves of players (including chance moves 
attributed to "nature"). In fact, Harsanyi's solution 
postulates that unknown features of the game should be 
interpreted as having been fixed by a chance move. 
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able tools of game-theoretical analysis could plausi-
bly be applied. In this spirit, I suggest that explo-
ration could be assisted by a thought experiment in 
which it is assumed that actors have no knowledge of 
each others' strategy options and payoff functions 7 -
but they do know that they are in an interdependent 
decision situation, and they know their own strategies 
and payoffs. 
If Bayesian solution concepts are ruled out, and if no 
additional sources of information are available, play-
ers would then need to resort to pragmatic rules for 
dealing with uncertainty which are likely to resemble 
the prudential "rules of evidence" that have always 
permitted legal systems to reach firm conclusions in 
the face of conflicting assertions. 8 Under the assumed 
conditions, rational actors would do well to concen-
trate their intelligence efforts on obtaining objec-
tive indicators for the action resources available to 
their opposite numbers. And if inferences derived from 
these indicators are associated with margins of error, 
they would do well to err on the side of greater cau-
7 Harsanyi (1967/68: 167) has shown that incom-
plete information about strategy spaces can be analyt-
ically reduced to incomplete information about payof f 
functions. But as the practical difficulties of ob-
taining valid information are quite different in the 
two cases, they need to be distinguished in empirical-
ly oriented discussion. 
8 Courts typically use a combination of prima-
f acie proof, controvertible and incontrovertible pre-
sumptions, and rules for allocating the burden of 
proof (i.e. the burden of non-persuasion), in order to 
resolve disputed questions of fact. 
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tion by applying appropriately skeptical rules of 
evidence. 
But while it will be generally possible to obtain 
pragmatically sufficient (conservative) estimates of 
strategic capabilities, expectations about other play-
ers' likely choices among these strategies are another 
matter. They imply knowledge of payoff functions which 
depend not only on objective states of the world, but 
also on their interpretation and evaluation by other 
players. Unlike capabilities, these subjective deci-
sion premises cannot be estimated by a combination of 
objective indicators and general cause-and-effect 
rules. Definitions of the situation are of crucial 
importance, and they may change. There is a world of 
difference between friendship and mortal enmity, yet 
one can turn into the other without prior changes in 
observable circumstances (Flam 1989). And when such 
redefinitions of the situation occur, innocuous re-
sources may turn into deadly weapons and deadly 
weapons may again change their character from an es-
sential means of self-protection to an unbearable 
burden on the economy. And even then, one may fall 
victim to strategic dissimulation and deception. 
However, if rational players have less reason to trust 
their estimates of other players' payoff functions, 
they have even more reason to resort to prudential 
rules in drawing their conclusions. At least in situa-
tions where the other side is capable of inflicting 
serious damage, they would do well to discount uncer-
tain estimates of others' payoffs, and to focus in-
stead on the consequences which others' potential 
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strategies would have for their own position. This is, 
of course, the "capabilities-not-intentions" logic, 
based on worst-case scenarios, that is considered 
"rational generalship" (Colman 1982: 51) and that was 
in fact characteristic of strategic thinking in the 
context of the cold-war arms race (Snyder 1971: 77; 
Jervis 1 9 7 8 ) . 
More generally, when players are ignorant about each 
other's payoffs, they cannot apply the central game-
theoretical "rationality principle", which would have 
directed them to anticipate the optimal choices of 
other players in determining their own best response 
(Hamburger 1979: 44). Of Harsanyi' s ( 1977: 116-118) 
two sets of rationality postulates, "payoff dominance" 
and "rational expectations", they are thus able to use 
only the former in order to select a strategy that is 
entirely derived from an analysis of their own pay-
offs. In other words, their interaction turns into a 
game against nature - except for the fact that they 
know that human opponents, unlike nature, are capable 
of guile and malevolence. 
In practice that means that players who are ignorant 
of each others' pa yo ff s should resort to cautious 
solution concepts. Thus, they should first eliminate 
strategies from their own repertoires whose outcomes 
are dominated by those of another strategy. Next, they 
ought to eliminate strategies which do not meet the 
maximin, or perhaps the maximin regret criterion (Col-
man 1982: 22-30). If that should still leave them with 
more than one eligible strategy, they might plausibly 
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pick the one with the highest average payoff (Hamburg-
er 1979: Chap. 3). 
Assuming that players are risk averse, 9 these rules of 
generalized caution would generate highly predictable 
outcomes even in single-shot encounters under condi-
tions of incomplete information. But how would such 
outcomes differ from solutions of the same game played 
under conditions of complete information? It is easy 
to see that opportunities for optimization must be 
lost if players cannot anticipate each other's moves. 
Yet whether these would have been opportunities for 
better cooperation or for more precise exploitation 
seems to depend entirely upon the character of the 
game that is being played (Diagram 1). 
Take the "Chicken" game, for instance, where mutual 
uncertainty about the payof f s of the other side would 
lead either player to adopt a maximin strategy that 
would assure a cooperative outcome. Or take Reinhard 
Selten's (1978) famous "Chain-Store Paradox", where 
each one of twenty small independent stores must sepa-
rately decide whether to challenge a monopolist by 
entering its market, while the monopolist must then 
choose between acquiescence and a costly price war. 
9 Under conditions of complete information, 
maximin would only be rational when players' interests 
are strictly opposed, but not otherwise. With payoff 
uncertainty, however, that is precisely the aspect of 
the interaction which is unknown. Logically, optimis-
tic and pessimistic presumptions might then be equally 
valid or invalid. But psychological research has shown 
that potential losses seem to weigh more heavily than 
potential gains (Kahneman/ Tversky 1984; Tversky/ 
Kahneman 1986). 
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Within the present context, it is obvious that a small 
store (for whom the game is a single-shot encounter) 
should not be willing to risk disaster if it were 
uncertain about the true pa yo ff s of the monopolist 
(Kreps/ Wilson 1982). In short: In the absence of 
reliable information about each other's payoffs, play-
ers are unable to exploit the weakness of their part-
ner's position. 
By the same token, however, players are also unable to 
exploit opportunities for cooperation arising from an 
underlying harmony of their interests. Even under the 
benign conditions of the "Assurance" game, uncertainty 
about the payoff s of the other side would render de-
fection the preferred choice. The same is true in 
"Battle of the Sexes" and, a fortiori, in the "Prison-
er's Dilemma", where cooperation could at best arise 
out of a sophisticated calculus of long-run mutual 
interest when the game is iterated. 10 
10 These analytical conclusions are reinforced by 
experimental research showing that even in long itera-
tions of the games of "Leader" and "Hero" (which is 
equivalent to Battle of the Sexes), cooperation is 
significantly lower when the players are not informed 
about the payo{f matrices of their partners (Guyer/ 
Rapoport 1969). Similar findings have been reported 
for the Prisoner's Dilemma (Rapoport/ Chamrnah 1965; 
Hamburger 1979: 238-242). Thus we have reason to think 
that the "evolution of cooperation among egoists" 
discovered in computer simulations of long iterations 
of the game (Axelrod 1984) depends critically on the 
empathy of players with the other side's calculus of 
self-interest. For that reason, and not merely because 
of greater monitoring difficulties (Hechter 1987: 75), 
cooperation is less likely to evolve, and more likely 
to break down, when more players are involved (Fox/ 
Guyer 1977). 
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Diagram 1: Strategies under Incomplete Information 
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The examples can be generalized: In the absence of 
reliable information about other players' payoff func-
tions, games become "unprofitable" in the sense that 
no player can rationally expect to receive more than 
her maximin payoff (Harsanyi 1977: 116). 11 But obvious-
ly, our thought experiment is not a model of all real-
life interactions - even though it may be a good re-
presentation of some types of international tension 
and of many domestic interactions among organizations 
or individuals which are characterized by general 
distrust, or by the disappointment of prior trust. 
What is important is the demonstration that games with 
incomplete information can still be played (and are in 
fact played) even if players are unable to resort to 
Bayesian solutions - but that their likely outcomes 
will be individually unprofitable and often socially 
inefficient. 12 
11 According to Harsanyi (1977: 138), solutions 
of profitable games depend on players' expectations 
about each other's strategies, while solutions of un-
profitable games are independent of such expectations. 
The present argument reverses this relationship: In 
the absence of reliable expectations, all games must 
be played as if they were unprofitable. 
12 We are thus not disputing the criticism di-
rected against the inefficiency of maximin solutions 
under conditions of incomplete information in vari-
able-sum games (and even in some types of zero-sum 
games: Kaysen 1952) with which the Bayesian solution 
is justified (Selten 1982). Our point is that such 
inefficient outcomes will in fact occur unless the 
players find ways to overcome their uncertainty about 
each other's payoffs - and that among these ways, the 
Bayesian solution is empirically less plausible than 
the mechanisms discussed below. 
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Yet since society as we know it is not characterized 
by generalized caution, the experiment leads us to 
seek solutions in another direction: If profitable 
games are in fact played (and if Bayesian solutions 
are empirically unlikely), actors must somehow be able 
to create or exploit conditions that allow them to 
interact as if they were playing with complete infor-
mation. If we accept this as our working hypothesis, 
our concern for the empirical validity of game-theo-
retical explanations leads us to search for mechanisms 
that could increase mutual predictability in three 
ways: 
they must increase the confidence of actors in 
their assumptions about the identity of the rele-
vant other players in a particular interaction; 
they must increase the confidence of actors in 
their estimates of the strategy options that other 
players will in fact consider; and 
they must increase the confidence of actors in 
their estimates of the payoff functions that will 
guide other players' choices among the strategies 
considered. 
Such confidence-building, or empathy-creating, mecha-
nisms could be either endogenous or exogenous to game-
theoretical models. In the first case, they would 
could be reconstructed from rational choices of play-
ers at the micro level; in the second case, the search 
would be extended to influences of the preexisting 
societal environment in which players and their games 
are embedded. In the following sections, both direc-
tions will be explored for the second and third of 
these mechanisms. Questions relating to the determina-
tion of relevant players will be taken up in the sec-
ond part of this article. 
26 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
2. The individualistic construction of empathy13 
The possibility that the informational preconditions 
for profitable games might be endogenously created 
through the interaction of rational individuals should 
be theoretically interesting even if we acknowledge 
the practical importance of socially constructed coor-
dination mechanisms (institutions and internalized 
social norms). For one thing, individualistic con-
structs might help to throw light on the evolution of 
norms and institutions (Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Kliemt 
1986; Shepsle 1989). Secondly, they might be necessary 
for explaining international and other types of "law-
less" interactions. And even when institutions are in 
place, complex, dynamic and pluralistic modern soci-
eties could not exist without wide margins of choice 
and discretionary action. The question is how actors 
could develop the converging expectations that are 
needed to structure these choices. 
There is of course an easy individualistic answer to 
the problem of incomplete information: If players have 
an interest in coordinating their expectations, they 
should agree on their permissible strategies and com-
municate their own payof f s to each other - in other 
words, they should play a cooperative game. But then, 
how could they trust each other? If truthful communi-
cation and binding agreements were dependent on exoge-
nous enforcement, we would have left the realm of 
13 The following section owes much to a discus-
sion with David Soskice who is, however, in no way 
responsible for my tentative answers to his incisive 
questions. 
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individualistic construction - unless one could show 
how such enforcement mechanisms could themselves arise 
in interactions that do not depend on exogenous en-
forcement. In game theory, that condition is expressed 
by the maxim that "any equilibrium, cooperatively 
reached or not, must be a noncooperative equilibrium" 
(Ordeshook 1986: 303). 
This seems a reasonable requirement in a world in 
which the existence of institutions is not presup-
posed. But solutions are made unnecessarily difficult 
if "noncooperative" games are defined by the absence 
of both communication and the exogenous enforcement of 
agreements, as is the usual convention in game-theo-
retical literature. Instead, I will here follow Har-
sanyi' s proposal to base the distinction exclusively 
on the availability of exogenous enforcement, so that 
"noncooperative" solutions could be derived from as-
sumptions that allow for the possibility of communi-
cation, and for nonbinding commitments among players. 
I will also adopt Harsanyi's further suggestion (1977: 
115) that every game may be thought to be preceded by 
a (possibly tacit) bargaining game in which players 
will try to achieve an agreed-upon definition of their 
allowable strategies and relevant payof f s - just as 
children's games or parlor games are often preceded by 
discussion and agreement on the applicable rules 
(Shepsle 1989). 
By itself, of course, that would not yet overcome the 
crucial problem of how players could be able to trust 
each other's communications and commitments in the 
absence of exogenous enforcement, nor does it help 
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much to know that some agreements may be self-enforc-
ing (Harsanyi 1977: 110). It is true, of course, that 
there are certain classes of games (e.g. "Assurance" ) , 
where the players have an interest in truthful commu-
nication and where agreements reached in pre-play 
bargaining would define a strong equilibrium from 
which no one has an interest to depart. But there are 
also other types of games (e.g. Chicken) where players 
would profit from misrepresenting their preferences 
and/or from defaulting on their commitments . 14 And 
since, given their initial ignorance of each other's 
payof f s, players could not know which type of game 
they are in fact playing, they cannot distinguish one 
type of communication from the other. They would re-
main locked in mutual distrust in both types of situa-
tions. 
In short, players cannot create the conditions of 
mutual credibility when the individual game is consid-
ered in isolation. However, they may be able to do so 
if the game is placed within a wider context. Among 
game theorists, it is a well known "folk theorem" that 
infinite15 iteration may change the outcome of other-
14 The temptation to misrepresent one's payoffs 
exists whenever players' most preferred outcomes dif-
fer from one another, and it is irrelevant when the 
other player has a dominant strategy. The temptation 
to default on an agreement exists when the agreed-upon 
(Pareto-efficient) solution is not a noncooperative 
equilibrium. Thus both types of temptation will exist 
in Chicken, and none of them in Assurance, while only 
the temptation to misrepresent exists in Battle of the 
Sexes, and only the temptation to default in the Pris-
oner's Dilemma. 
15 In finite iterations, rational players would 
defect on the last play, and hence also on the second-
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wise dilemmatic games because it permits players to 
make their next move contingent on their opponent's 
previous choice. Thus it has been shown for the iter-
ated Prisoner's Dilemma that cooperation will emerge 
as a self-enforcing equilibrium when players follow a 
"tit-for-tat" strategy that responds in kind to each 
instance of the opponents cooperation of defection 
(Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987). The same logic, it is 
suggested, may also help to solve the problem of 
truthful communications and credible commitments under 
conditions of incomplete information. 
However, since not all real-life games have the form 
of a Prisoner's Dilemma, and since infinite or even 
indefinite iterations of identical games are rare in 
any case, the logic must be modified in order to be-
come more generally applicable. This is achieved with 
the help of Harsanyi's distinction between the primary 
game that is in fact being played, and the pre-play 
bargaining game in which payoff s may be communicated 
and strategies agreed upon. While all primary games 
may differ from one another, they may still be em-
bedded in an open-ended series of interactions among 
the same players. When that is the case, the corre-
sponding instances of pre-play bargaining may be con-
ceptualized as a more abstract and indefinitely iter-
ated "truth game" 16 in which each player must choose 
to-last play, and so on. Whether the backward induc-
tion of this "endgame effect" can be avoided in games 
with incomplete information is disputed: Fudenberg/ 
Maskin (1986); Giith et al., (1988). 
16 The idea of a "truth game" was introduced by 
Brams (1985: 119-126) in the context of his analysis 
of the arms race among superpowers. What is different 
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each time whether to tell the truth about her own 
pa yo ff s, and whether to keep agreements about her 
strategies. Correspondingly, each player must also 
choose each time whether to trust other's communica-
tions and commitments. 
Now if all instances of default could be detected 
after the fact, each player would be able to respond 
in the next round to the other's previous performance 
in the truth game. If we further assume that players 
do in fact have a common interest in being able to 
play profitable games based on trustworthy communica-
tions and commitments, the game-theoretical " folk 
theorem" suggests that they should be able to reach 
that outcome through individually rational strategies 
(Fudenberg/ Maskin 1986). But that conclusion is based 
on two critical assumptions that need to be discussed. 
First, the folk theorem will not help if defaults 
cannot be detected before the other player has to make 
her next move - which may be so in arms-control nego-
tiations. But even when the actual choice of strat-
egies can be verified after the fact, there will often 
be no possibility of direct verification for the ~ 
off s that have been communicated. While their truth 
may sometimes be indirectly confirmed or disconf irmed 
by the actual choice of strategies (if these can be 
observed), there are also cases where even that is not 
possible (Diagram 2). 
here are the assumptions of iteration and of the di-
versity of the underlying primary games. 
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Take the example of a Chicken game in which the row 
player misrepresents her own payof f s as being of the 
Prisoner's-Dilemma variety. If she is believed, "Col-
umn" will expect "Row" to pick D as her dominant 
strategy, and will choose C herself in order to avoid 
her own worst-case outcome. As this will then allow 
"Row" to in fact play D in accordance with her true 
(Chicken) preferences, the deception cannot be discov-
ered. 17 A counterexample is provided by a game where 
"Column" has Assurance-type and "Row" Prisoner's-
Dilemma-type preferences. If "Row" pretends to also 
17 Of course, if both should misrepresent their 
preferences in this fashion, and if each should be-
lieve the other, the deception would become visible -
and both would be surprised to find themselves with a 
cooperative outcome in the C/C cell. 
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have Assurance preferences, "Column" will be deceived 
into cooperation. But if "Row" then defects in accor-
dance with her true PD preferences, the deception will 
be revealed. 
The examples can be generalized to similar types of 
games in which "reputation" makes a difference. 18 
While a false reputation for being cooperative will be 
destroyed if it is exploited, a false reputation for 
toughness can survive its application if the threat is 
believed and the bluff not called. 19 In such cases, the 
deceived party will be deterred to accept a poor 
bargain that is then kept by the other side. As far 
as I can see, there is no generally effective protec-
tion against the misrepresentation of payof f s in 
threat games - except of course the fallback strategy 
of generalized caution. But it is important to realize 
that the victim of a false threat is in fact no worse 
off than she would have been if she had disbelieved 
all communications and stayed with her maximin strate-
gy to begin with. So the real dangers that players 
must guard against are not false threats but false 
promises - which may in fact lead to outcomes that are 
18 On the general importance of reputation for 
the explanation of economic outcomes, see Akerlof 
(1980). 
19 In the game-theoretical literature, the use 
(and the risk) of a reputation for toughness has been 
discussed in the contexts of international relations 
and of legislative leadership (Ward 1987; Calvert 
1987; Alt/ Calvert/ Humes 1988). It has also been 
shown that under conditions of incomplete (Kreps I 
Wilson 1982) or imperfect information (Trockel 1986), 
the reputation for toughness can be used to construct 
a solution of the "Chain-Store Paradox". 
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below the maximin threshold. But these will show up 
after the individual play, and thus can be sanctioned 
by appropriate reactive strategies in indefinite 
iterations of the truth game. 
But what should this reactive strategy be? For itera-
tions of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Michael Taylor (1987) 
and Robert Axelrod (1984) have shown that a provokable 
but forgiving "tit-for-tat'' strategy is superior not 
only to pure coo~~ration and pure defection but also 
to an unforgiving response of "eternal damnation" 
after a single instance of defection. However, if the 
type of primary game that is being played is not 
initially known, but is drawn from a population that 
includes not only the PD, but also Assurance, Battle 
of the Sexes, Chicken and other games, tit-for-tat is 
not a plausible strategy for the truth game. In fact, 
a player who was known to be committed to tit-for-tat 
would become the perfect victim of exploitation 
deceived whenever the primary game happened to be 
Chicken, and willing to forgive after each play of 
Assurance (where telling the truth is in the other 
player's self-interest). By contrast, an unforgiving 
response ("once a liar, always a liar") to a single 
instance of deception would seem to be a superior 
strategy in the truth game.m 
20 The strategy makes sense on the assumption 
that a player who cheats in the truth game reveals 
herself to have a high discount of the future that 
justifies the expectation that she will cheat again 
when that is profitable in a primary game. 
Alternatively, one might consider a strategy that 
begins with generalized caution in first encounters 
and that incrementally increases the level of one's 
trust in opponents' communications with each subse-
quent instance of demonstrated truthfulness (in games 
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An opponent confronted with the unforgiving strategy 
would then face the following choice in the truth 
game: By being truthful, she would maintain access to 
future games in which her own communications are 
trusted - and which, therefore, could be more profit-
able than encounters governed by generalized caution. 
A single case of (detected) deception, however, would 
thereafter restrict her to interactions in which her 
own communications would be distrusted, and in which 
her opponent would revert to generalized caution in 
all primary games. Thus the temptation to deceive in 
an individual case would have to be weighed against 
the lesser profitability of all future interactions. 21 
The same logic does of course apply a fortiori to all 
situations where different games are simultaneously 
ongoing among the same parties (McGinnis 1986). 
There are two reasons, however, why the deterrent 
effect of an unforgiving strategy cannot generally 
assure the truthfulness of communications and the 
credibility of commitments. First, if punishment must 
be applied, it is often costly (Molm 1989). More 
specifically, the player who must in fact revert to 
generalized caution after a single instance of decep-
where deception would have been advantageous) . This 
accumulated "credit rating" could be depleted by a 
single instance of detected deception, but might be 
rebuilt again (perhaps under more difficult condi-
tions). 
21 If the opponent applies generalized caution 
thereafter, there would be no more opportunities to 
profit from cheating in games with conflicting inter-
ests, and both would not be able to profit in games 
with compatible interests. 
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tion must also deprive herself of future profitable 
interactions even in games with common interests like 
Assurance. Thus the temptation to forgive in later 
games may be too great to maintain the deterrent 
ef feet. 22 Moreover, even a credible threat to be unfor-
giving would not of fer protection against a "hit-and-
run" or "confidence-game" player who would build up 
trust in the truth game in order to facilitate one big 
"killing" after which interactions are terminated. 
Since breaches of trust do in fact occur, we have no 
reason to construct a theory that would exclude them 
altogether. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to seek 
endogenous mechanisms that could explain why they do 
not occur much more often. Such mechanisms can be 
found by again extending the truth game to include a 
wider context. In the real world, ongoing relation-
ships are not restricted to dyadic interactions, but 
often will take place within a population of actors 
who are aware of, and able to communicate with, each 
other. Thus other players could also respond with an 
unforgiving strategy of generalized caution when it is 
their turn to play against a former defector. But as 
that form of sanctioning also entails costs for these 
later players, what still needs to be explained is why 
they should be motivated to punish. 23 
22 That presupposes that the "interaction orien-
tation" (which will be discussed below) remains con-
stant. But if the deceived party should be sufficient-
ly angry or humiliated, she might switch from an "in-
dividualistic" to an "aggressive" orientation in which 
her own costs would no longer matter. 
23 Axelrod ( 1986) demonstrated in computer simu-
lations that a meta-norm which makes not punishing a 
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In game-theoretical analyses, it is usually assumed 
that players do not have the choice of refusing to 
play a game. That maximizes the costs of punishment. 
The cost-benefit balance is much improved, however, 
when it is possible to relax this assumption (Tullock 
1985). In many real-life situations, actors are indeed 
able to choose whether and with whom they are willing 
to play. Thus, when confronted with a former defector, 
a player would have the following choices: (1) playing 
with the defector and trusting her communications; (2) 
playing with the defector and applying generalized 
caution; ( 3) playing with someone else; and ( 4) not 
playing at all. If options ( 3) or ( 4) are at all 
attractive, the cost of punishment associated with 
avoiding option (1) could be much reduced, while the 
severity of punishment, and hence its likely deterrent 
effect on potential defectors, would increase. 
Under such conditions, the motive of self-protection 
against the possibility of being cheated may be all 
that is needed to assure the ostracism of players that 
are known to have defaulted on previous occasions. It 
may even be sufficient to provide a commercial market 
for reliable information about the "credit-worthiness" 
of other players whose past defaults one could not 
have observed directly (Milgrom/ North/ Weingast 
1988). And if the discounted disadvantage of being 
defector a punishable of fense could generate a stable 
equilibrium of universal punishment. But the emergence 
of this meta-norm is not itself explained as the out-
come of rational choices. Similarly, Witt (1986) com-
bines social learning and evolutionary hypotheses to 
show how the tendency to cooperate, and to punish 
defectors, might be stabilized after it has, somehow, 
become dominant in a population. 
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excluded from future profitable games is greater than 
the present gain from cheating in a single game, 
rational players will have reason to maintain their 
reputation for keeping promises and telling the truth 
even in single-shot encounters with strangers whom 
they will not meet again.~ 
To conclude this exercise in speculative exploration: 
Even in the absence of exogenous enforcement and of 
exogenous motivations to punish, it seems possible to 
construct "incentive-compatible" mechanisms (Hurwicz 
1972) that would allow rational, self-interested 
players to create environments where complete-informa-
tion conditions can be approximated. And to the extent 
that this enlarged truth game is in fact being played, 
it should create favorable conditions for the credible 
communication of payoffs, and for reliable agreements 
on strategy choices, 25 that will greatly increase the 
relevance and usefulness of "classical game theory" 
for the analysis of real-life interactions. 
It must be seen, however, that the notion of pre-play 
bargaining is no more than an analytically useful 
2~ It is, of course, possible that sanctions will 
be applied only when all players involved are members 
of an in-group, while cheating against outsiders is 
permissible. Uwe Schimank has pointed out the similar-
ity of a such a pattern to the "amoral familism" in 
backward societies described by Banfield (1958) . 
25 In zero-sum games, truthful pre-play bargain-
ing would of course serve no useful purpose. Thus, "no 
comment" would be an appropriate communication in the 
truth game, while cheating would still need to be 
ostracized in order to maintain a context that assures 
credible communications. 
38 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
fiction, 26 and that the existence of a truth game also 
needs to be empirically verified before it can be used 
for explaining real interactions and outcomes. Strict-
ly speaking, we have only shown that it is possible 
that actors might achieve common knowledge of payoff s 
and strategies under conditions whose existence is not 
ruled out by what we know. Yet in an empirical world 
of complex interactions, where undisciplined theoreti-
cal speculation is not self-correcting, while barefoot 
empiricism cannot find the forest behind the trees, we 
must have an interest in internally consistent analyt-
ical models derived from plausible assumptions. Thus, 
the construct of a truth game could at least serve as 
a useful guide to what is worth searching for in 
empirical research (Abel 1948). 
But even if that is granted, pre-play bargaining by 
itself cannot generally assure the empirical appli-
cability of game-theoretical models. First, the postu-
lated preconditions for the enlarged truth game, low-
cost choice among partners and low-cost information 
about past defaults of potential partners, will often 
not exist. 27 Second and more important, the assumptions 
26 Plausibility is not increased by Harsanyi' s 
( 19 7 7: 112) "principle of tacit bargaining", which 
assumes that players of sufficient intelligence can 
reach any agreement on payoff distribution by tacit 
understanding if they could have reached it by explic-
it bargaining. This presupposes that payoffs have 
become common knowledge in some other fashion. 
27 For instance, many corporate actors such as 
nation-states, government organizations, political 
parties, labor unions and employer associations, do 
not have the option of avoiding each other, and the 
same is true of individual members of organizations or 
families. On the other hand, these captive players may 
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introduced could only assure the credibility of commu-
nications and agreements, but they do nothing to 
reduce the information costs associated with idiosyn-
cratic perceptions and preferences. To construct 
common-knowledge conditions on this foundation alone 
would impose enormous burdens on the communicative 
capacities of real-life actors who would have to 
recollect, specify, transmit, and interpret, all 
decision premises that are potentially relevant in 
Gharacteristically ambiguous interaction situations. 
And even if such feats of communication are conceiv-
able among parties with a long history of close asso-
ciation, they would create serious problems for empir-
ical research. Game-theoretical explanations might 
thus be entirely valid, and at the same time pragmati-
cally useless, if they should in every case depend on 
a precise reconstruction of the idiosyncratic (and 
mostly tacit) understandings among specific actors. 
3. The social construction of empathy 
Thus we have reason to extend our search for solutions 
to the common-knowledge problem to include mechanisms 
that have lower information costs for actors as well 
as for researchers. If such mechanisms cannot be found 
within the strict confines of rational-choice prem-
ises, they nevertheless seem to be available just 
across the paradigmatic boundary. In trying to clarify 
the preconditions of social order, social scientists 
working in the functionalist, institutionalist or 
have exc~llent opportunities for monitoring defaults 
and applying varieties of sanctions. 
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symbolic-interactionist traditions have always focused 
on exactly those factors that are able to reduce 
information costs by limiting the range of human 
choices and world views. From a rational-choice per-
spective, these approaches are often attacked for 
their lack of generality, their inadequate conceptual-
ization of purposeful action, and their implicit 
determinism. In response, there are comparable attacks 
by social scientists on the imperialism of the econom-
ic paradigm and the incredible naivety of its underly-
ing assumptions. More promising than such confronta-
tions, however, is an emergent perspective, on both 
sides of the paradigmatic fence, 28 that considers 
traditional social-science and rational-choice ap-
proaches not as competitors, but as useful complements 
to each other. While this paper is not intended as a 
substantive contribution to this unifying perspective, 
it may be useful to indicate how it could help to 
facilitate the use of game-theoretical explanations in 
empirical research. 29 
28 Among examples that come to mind are the works 
of Bruno Frey (1980), Nelson and Winter (1982), Ray-
mond Boudon (1983; 1988), Mark Granovetter (1985), 
Hartmut Kliemt (1985; 1986), Elinor Ostrom (1986), 
James S. Coleman (1986) Amitai Etzioni (1988) or March 
and Olsen (1989). 
29 By this I do not intend to take sides in the 
philosophical debate between "monists" (e.g. Linden-
berg 1983; 1989), who believe that "ultimately" all 
social phenomena must be reducible to self-interested 
choices, and "dualists" (e.g. Kliemt 19 85; Etzioni 
1988), who insist that institutions, social norms and 
moral laws cannot be so reduced. My reasons for using 
game theory as the dominant frame of reference are 
pragmatic: while I do not see how choice-oriented 
knowledge could be integrated in, say, a functionalist 
perspective (Scharpf 1989b), game theory seems able to 
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Regardless of all divisions among competing schools, 
sociologists and political scientists have always been 
in broad agreement about the importance of two sets of 
factors that are directly pertinent to the information 
problems associated with game-theoretical explana-
tions, namely 
power structures and institutionalized rule systems 
that will exclude a wide range of physically feasi-
ble behavior as being infeasible or impermissible 
in a given interaction situation, and 
socially or culturally constructed systems of 
meaning that will exclude a wide range of subjec-
tively conceivable preferences and perceptions as 
being irrelevant in a given interaction situation. 
Both sets of factors define a social context that does 
not have to be created de novo by individual actors. 
When games are "embedded" in this context, strategies 
and payoff matrices become "socially constructed" 
and hence transparent for players who must choose 
their moves within a well-defined set of options and 
who know that their partners must do so as well. As 
Norton Long (1961: 140-1) put it in his discussion of 
"The Local Community as an Ecology of Garnes": 
"Here we deal with the essence of predictability in 
social affairs. If we know the game being played is 
baseball and that X is a third baseman, by knowing 
his position and the game being played we can tell 
more about X' s activities on the field than we 
could if we examined X as a psychologist or psychi-
atrist. If such were not the case, X would belong 
in the mental ward rather than in a ball park. The 
behavior of X is not some disembodied rationality 
use social-science knowledge about actors, and the 
institutions and cultural orientations influencing 
their choices. 
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but, rather, behavior within an 
activity that has goals, norms, 




and ground for 
In short, "baseball structures the situation" - and so 
does the "political game", the "banking game", the 
"contracting game", the "newspaper game", the "civic 
organization game", or the "ecclesiastical game," all 
of which are simultaneously ongoing and interacting 
with each other in Long' s perception of the local 
community. Similarly, when Michel Crozier (1976) and 
Crozier and Friedberg (1979: 66-73) speak of the 
"games" that constitute the reality of the organiza-
tions they have studied, they refer to empirically 
discoverable (formal and informal) "rules of the game" 
that define the strategies among which actors must 
choose, and the gains and losses about which they must 
be concerned if they wish to continue playing within 
the organization. 
Thus, even though neither Long nor Crozier and Fried-
berg were much interested in the information require-
ments of game-theoretical models, or in formal models 
at all, 30 they have specified conditions under which 
the contingency and ambiguity of the world is suffi-
ciently reduced to make complete information games a 
plausible assumption. Moreover, if relevant strategies 
3
° Crozier does in fact consider the possibility 
that the empirically discovered rules of the game 
"could eventually be formalized according to rough 
game theory models" (1976: 196, 203). But in his view, 
such formalization can only "be done ex post - i.e. 
when one knows the outcomes. The strategies and the 
payof f s can be interesting only for comparative pur-
poses" (1976: 206, note 3). 
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and payof f s are in fact defined by reference to exist-
ing power relations, formal and informal rules and 
shared meanings, their discovery should also become a 
much more manageable task for empirical research. 
In some fields of highly structured and highly public 
interaction - e.g. in the legislative arena - it may 
be entirely sufficient to draw on legal and customary 
rules and publicly documented outcomes in order to 
determine both the set of available strategies and the 
(proximate) payoffs that players are trying to maxi-
mize. That explains the persuasiveness of game-theo-
retical explanations of coalition formation and roll-
call voting in Congress and its committees (Shepsle 
1979; Shepsle/ Weingast 1981; 1987; Denzau/ Riker/ 
Shepsle 1985). In many other areas, however, power 
relations and (legal and organizational) systems of 
rules that are backed by institutionalized sanctions 
will not fully determine the value of payof f s, but 
will nevertheless constrain the range of strategy 
choices that actors and observers need to take into 
consideration (Ostrom 1986; Burns/ Flam 1987). 
Thus boundary rules may effectively restrict access 
to decision arenas to legitimate participants and 
may permit actors and observers to ignore "outsid-
ers" even if they are also affected by the outcome 
of interactions in the arena. In game-theoretical 
terms, they define who the players are likely to 
be. This point will be taken up again in the second 
part of the article. 
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Constitutional and procedural decision rules will 
restrict the issues that may be dealt with in an 
arena, and the types of action that are permissi-
ble. They also define which actors are allowed to 
participate in what role in which type of deci-
sions; and they prescribe the rule by which the 
contributions of individual participants will be 
aggregated (unanimity, qualified majority, plurali-
ty, hierarchy). In game-theoretical terms, decision 
rules restrict the range of strategies that players 
can be expected to use, and they may also restrict 
the range of outcomes that can be achieved in 
interactions - and hence the payof f s obtainable by 
players. 
While actors in control of potent power resources 
(e.g. the means of physical violence) may sometimes be 
able to disregard formal rules, institutional legiti-
macy is itself an action resource that is difficult 
and often impossible to substitute by other means. 
Nevertheless, it is rare that power constraints and 
institutionalized rules will completely determine the 
choice among feasible strategies. Thus actors' percep-
tions of the situation and their preferences among 
outcomes - i.e. their perceived payoff matrices 
will generally be important for any attempt to predict 
their choices. But, again, these perceptions and 
preferences need not be empirically determined de novo 
in every case. Often it will be possible to refer to 
plausible "bridge assumptions" instead. 
The term refers to empirically based assumptions about 
regularities in the orientation of certain classes of 
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actors in certain situations. While some of these 
bridge assumptions may be of near-universal validity, 
most of them will be time and space specific in their 
applicability. In either case, however, they may be 
(provisionally) used as substitutes for specifically 
collected data on individual preferences and percep-
tions in the formulation of empirically testable 
hypotheses (Homans 19 61; Lindenberg 19 8 3; 19 8 9) . I 
find it useful to distinguish three levels of such 
bridge assumptions - definitions of basic self-inter-
est, social norms, and interaction orientations. 
At the first level, we are interested in definitions 
of self-interest that are so general and so basic that 
they may plausibly be imputed to most actors. While 
Adam Smith had tried to get by with two types of 
universal definitions of utility, "social approval" 
and "physical well-being", Siegwart Lindenberg (1989: 
190) found it necessary to add the "minimization of 
loss" to that short list, and other authors have 
provided much longer catalogues of "values" (Lasswell/ 
Kaplan 1950 )31 or of "basic human needs" (Maslow 1970). 
For corporate actors, a similar list might include 
organizational survival, autonomy and growth. To the 
extent that these fundamental interests are seriously 
at stake in an interaction, they may be all that is 
needed to explain actors' choices in what has been 
31 It is interesting to note, however, that the 
eight Lasswellian values are grouped into two larger 
categories corresponding closely to Smith's original 
dichotomy, namely "welfare values" (including well-
being, wealth, skill and enlightenment) and "deference 
values" (power, respect, rectitude and affection) 
(Lasswell/ Kaplan 195; 55-56). 
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called "single-exit" or "high-cost situations" (Latsis -
1972; Zintl 1989). 
In many other situations, however, basic self-interest 
by itself will be less directly useful as a predictor. 
Even if it should still be the sole motivating force 
of human action (as would be claimed from a radical 
"monistic" perspective), its pursuit would be mediated 
by social norms in the widest sense. They define, in 
Lindenberg's apt metaphor, the "production function" 
through which an actor's choices contribute to the 
attainment of her ultimate goals (Lindenberg 1989: 
190-192) . 32 If a doctor seeks social approval, she must 
fulfil! the role expectations of a good doctor, and if 
political parties seek to maximize votes, they must 
present candidates and platforms that believably 
pursue the public interest. In this sense, the ab-
stract calculus of self-interest is less instructive 
for explanations and predictions even of purposeful 
choices than a "logic of appropriateness" (March/ 
Olsen 1989), which defines specific criteria of rele-
vance and rightness that actors use in judging their 
own and others' choices. 33 
_ 
32 Lindenberg (1989: 187-189) also introduces the 
theoretically promising notion that - as a consequence 
of bounded rationality - actors will at any one time 
only be able to focus on a single goal (among many 
potentially relevant ones) that then "frames" the 
choice situation. This provides a theoretical opening 
for treating social norms as "situationally prescribed 
goals" which may, however, lose their predictive power 
if another value gains in situational salience. 
33 March and Olson ( 1989) oppose the "logic of 
appropriateness" to the "logic of consequentiality", 
rather than to a ''logic of self-interest". This seems 
problematical if one assumes that norm-oriented behav-
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Among these cri teria we may distinguish norms defined 
e i ther in terms of universalistic justice, morality or 
fairness (Etzioni 1988; March/ Olsen 1989), or in 
terms of the specific (individual and collective) 
identities to which actors must refer for their "self-
interested" evaluation of outcomes. 34 At least the 
latter kind of group-oriented social norms are often 
sanctioned by the highly effective threat of collec-
tive disapproval and ostracism. Of even greater prac-
tical importance are functionally specific orienta-
tions defined by the specific codes of relevance and 
excellence associated with different societal subsys-
tems (Luhmann 1986), with socially coherent profes-
sions, or with the development of large technical 
systems (Mayntz/ Hughes 1988). Outsiders will have 
learned to take these specific criteria for granted, 
and insiders will have internalized them through 
professional socialization supported by the incentives 
i0r is not necessarily purely expressive, but may also 
be concerned with expected consequences for the values 
that the norm serves. A more systematic treatment 
would thus need to distinguish at least two dimen-
sions, "instrumental vs. expressive" and "self-inter-
ested vs. norm-oriented." 
34 As Jon Elster (1983: 35-36:) has pointed out, 
certain arguments simply cannot be stated publicly in 
a particular setting. "In a political discussion it is 
pragmatically impossible to assert that a given solu-
t ion be chosen simply because it favors oneself or the 
group to which one belongs." The reason, I submit, is 
a definition of the collective identity that is appro-
priate for the particular debate. If the same issues 
were discussed by the same individuals within an in-
terest organization, or within their own family, dif-
ferent criteria of relevance would exclude different 
types of arguments. 
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and disincentives associated with professional reputa-
tion and ostracism. 
In addition to universalistic, group-oriented and 
function-oriented social norms, whose relevance is 
generally acknowledged in the social sciences, I find 
it useful to discuss a third level of bridge assump-
tions which, for want of a better label, I will here 
describe as "interaction orientations". 35 It is of 
particular relevance in the context of game-theoreti-
cal analyses which focus on interactions among the 
goals or interests of two or more actors. Like stan-
dard economics, game theory usually assumes an "indi-
vidualistic" orientation in which all actors are only 
concerned with their own utility (however its defini-
tion may be mediated through social norms). But that 
is not always true. Interactions between political 
parties or sports teams are clearly governed by a \ 
"competitive" orientation in which one's own success 
or failure depends very much on payoffs received by 
other players. In a different way, these also matter 
in interactions within a sports team, a government 
coalition, a joint business venture, or perhaps a 
happy marriage - all of which depend on "solidaristic" 
orientations that bring members to care not only about 
their own payof f, but about the aggregate payof f 
received by all partners jointly. Other possibilities 
35 The phenomenon has been discussed under a 
variety of labels, including "social motives" (Mac-
Crimmon/ Messick 19 7 6), "styles of decision making" 
(Scharpf 1988; 1989), "social orientations" (Schulz/ 
May 1989), or "social payoffs" (Burns 1989). The term 
proposed here has the advantage of emphasizing inter-
action effects and differing more clearly from "social 
norms". 
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include "egalitarian", "altruistic" or "aggressive" 
orientations. 36 
All of these non- "individualistic" orientations have 
the effect of relating the player's utility in specif-
ic ways to the payoffs received by other players, and 
they often derive their motivating force from underly-
ing emotions (love, communal feelings, envy, fear, 
anger or hate) that make people care about others in 
one way or another (Flam 1989). Given the potential 
instability of the underlying emotions, interaction 
orientations may also be quite volatile. Theoretically 
more interesting, in the present context, is the 
possibility that particular types of mixed-motive 
games may generate endogenous shifts of dominant 
orientations in response to past moves of other play-
ers. 37 When such shifts occur, the "effective matrix" 
of the game 38 may radically change its character. While 
a solidaristic orientation will transform all dilemmas 
into games of pure coordination, a shift from individ-
ualistic to competitive orientations will transform 
36 For the complete list of experimentally iden-
tifiable "social orientations", see Schulz and May 
1989). 
37 A good e xample is the characteristic cycle of 
political coalitions moving from a "honeymoon" of 
solidaristic orientations through self-interested 
individualism to competition and, perhaps, outright 
hostility. Such cycles are to be expected in game 
constellations resembling Battle of the Sexes. 
38 The "effective matrix" which governs players' 
choices is the transformation of an objectively "given 
matrix" by a transformation rule representing what I 
have labelled the interaction orientation (Kelley/ 
Thibaut 1978: 14-17) . 
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any mixed-motive game into zero-sum conflict (Scharpf 
1989). 
That is not meant to deny that volatility is not 
everywhere, and that these interaction orientations 
are also regulated by social norms. 39 Buyers and sell-
ers in the market are expected to be guided by indi-
vidualistic "interests", rather than by their "pas-
sions" (Hirschman 1977); sports teams and political 
parties should compete with each other, but their 
internal interactions should be solidaristic; and 
guardians as well as doctors, psychotherapists and 
other members of the helping professions are supposed 
to have an altruistic concern for the interests of 
their wards and clients (Barber 1983). Nevertheless, 
interaction orientations should probably not be con-
sidered as just another type of social norm. Norms are 
typically addressed to individual actors. Yet when the ~ 
very definition of a relationship is concerned, "it 
takes two to tango" - meaning that it may be difficult 
or impossible to unilaterally maintain a solidaristic, 
altruistic, egalitarian or even individualistic orien-
tation if other players are competitive or hostile. As 
a consequence, the binding force of social norms is 
likely to be attenuated by the mutual dependence of 
interaction orientations - which also means that 
empirical game research must be sensitive to the fact 
that actors will retain a high degree of mutual con-
39 As Helena Flam has pointed out, social norms 
may either define what is appropriate to feel in a 
situation, or they may prescribe rule-oriented action 
that substitutes for emotion-based behavior. 
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trol over the effective definition of their relation-
ship. 40 
4. Discussion 
But where do all these possibilities of socially 
constructed orientations leave us in our quest for 
parsimonious explanations? Even if they help us in 
formula ting empirically testable hypotheses, it is 
important to realize that the bridcj'e assumptions 
discussed above can, at best, provide conditional 
simplifications. There are essentially three reasons 
why predictions or explanations based on them might 
fail in empirical applications. 
First, since human actors have acquired the potential 
of thinking and acting on their own, there is no way 
in which socially constructed interests, rules, norms, 
or interaction orientations can completely determine 
their perceptions and valuations. As individuals are 
capable of ignoring their own survival interests, they 
are also capable of violating institutionalized rules 
and social norms, even if they have to pay a price for 
it. Even more important, for practical purposes, are 
the inventiveness and determination of individuals in 
shaping, bending and manipulating institutions and 
40 From a research point of view, it is neverthe-
less encouraging that these interaction orientations 
seem to fall into a limited number of patterns that 
can be operationally defined. It is not yet clear, 
however, whether it will be possible to develop infor-
mation-efficient methods for identifying these orien-
tations in the type of materials accessible to empiri-
cal (as distinguished from experimental) research. 
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norms to serve their own purposes. There is, in other 
words, reason to be on guard against "oversocialized 
conceptions of human nature" (Granovetter 1985), and 
to allow for the possibility of idiosyncratic action 
that does not conform to the regularities predicted by 
bridge assumptions. 
Second, and theoretically more interesting, the so-
cially constructed mechanisms that standardize and 
coordinate behavior are only able to support time and 
space specific empirical regularities or "quasi-laws", 
rather than general laws of universal validity. The 
reason is straightforward: Coordinating mechanisms are 
the more advantageous, the more they are in fact 
followed. In technical language, they have positive 
scale effects. Thus, behavioral regularities that 
already exist have a competitive advantage over new 
proposals, even if these would have been superior when 
considered in the abstract. When that is so, their 
evolution becomes path-dependent, and historical 
accidents make a difference in the selection of one 
pattern of behavioral regularities over its potential 
competitors (David 1985). 
As a consequence, there is no theoretical reason to 
assume that history should be "efficient" (March/ 
Olsen 1989: Chap. 4) or that institutional arrange-
ments, social norms or social orientations should 
converge toward unique and hence universal equilibria. 
In practice that means that in our empirical work we 
cannot rely on bridge assumptions whose empirical 
validity was established elsewhere or at another time. 
The norms and interaction orientations guiding Swedish 
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unions in the 1970s were different from those prevail-
ing in Britain, but they also differed from those that 
had been documented in Sweden during the 1960s. For 
the same reason, the assumption which is still 
characteristic of most economic research - that busi-
ness firms or banks should have identical utility 
functions in the United States, in Europe and in Japan 
rests on weak theoretical foundations. Explanations 
and predictions based on bridge assumptions may thus 
fail because we have not taken care to determine the 
specific content of the quasi-laws that apply in the 
time-space region that we are studying. 
They may also fail for a third reason that relates 
back to the individualistic construction of empathy 
discussed above. Bridge assumptions, whether derived 
from institutionalized rules, basic interests, social 
norms or socially regulated interaction orientations, 
can only define standardized expectations. They are 
useful tools for empirical research within a game-
theoretical frame of reference because we can assume 
that actors must rely on them for their expectations 
when they do not know very much about their partners 
in a given interaction situation. 
Yet there are in fact many interactions where the 
players do know a good deal more about each other 
because, as Mark Granovetter (1985) has emphasized, 
specific encounters are often "embedded" not only in 
the general context of institutional rules and social 
norms, but also in ongoing personal relations and 
networks of such relations. When such ongoing rela-
tions do exist, the reliability of actors' expecta-
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tions, and their trust in each other's commitments, 
are raised far above the level that would be reason-
able among even well-socialized strangers. As was 
suggested above, and as Granovetter himself points 
out, this increase in empathy is not an unmixed bless-
ing. It creates opportunities not only for mutually 
advantageous cooperation but also for exploitation: 
"The more complete the trust, the greater the poten-
tial gain from malfeasance" ( 1985: 491) . 41 But that is 
only the reverse side of the same coin. What is more 
important is the fact that these personal relations 
and networks of personal relations will widen the 
range of motives that can be pursued in an interac-
tion. 
"Profitable games", we have seen, can only be played 
if players' payoff functions are common knowledge. By 
reverse implication, that also restricts the range of ~ 
motives, which even cooperative players are able to 
pursue, to a subset of which one can safely presume 
mutual awareness. Institutionalized rules, social 
norms and other bridge assumptions provide a general 
basis for such mutual awareness. But - as Georg Sinunel 
( 1917 /1984: 33-39) pointed out long ago - the very 
generality of such orientations systematically ex-
41 That explains why the mere communication of 
idiosyncratic concerns is facilitated by the absence 
of opportunities for ~onsequential interaction (e.g. 
among strangers meeting in a railroad compartment or 
on a vacation). But where interaction is possible or 
inevitable, higher levels of voluntarily granted empa-
thy depend on trust. In its absence, any attempt to 
increase one's understanding of another's payoffs be-
yond the limits of conventional concerns and motives 
becomes a violation of "privacy" or a case of "espio-
nage". 
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eludes those aspirations in which human beings tend 
to differ from one another. Even if we should not 
share Simmel's pessimism that this must always dis-
criminate against "higher" aspirations, 42 it is clear 
that it must exclude wide ranges of concerns which are 
extremely valuable to actors, and in which they could 
enormously benefit from empathetic interaction and 
exchange. 
Ongoing personal relations and networks of such rela-
tions are in fact able to create the preconditions for 
higher levels of empathy among actors. Where that is 
so, they permit more idiosyncratic concerns to be 
communicated and understood and to become the object 
of interdependent action. Thus even if the importance 
of standardized bridge assumptions is fully recog-
nized, the "individualistic construction of empathy" 
discussed above retains its practical significance, 
since it allows actors to achieve greater scope and 
precision in their coordination of expectations than 
can be attained through the "social construction of 
empathy." 
42 For Simmel, this constitutes the "sociological 
tragedy": 
"Der Einzelne mag noch so feine, hochentwickelte, 
durchgebildete Quali ta ten besi tzen - gerade je mehr 
das der Fall ist, desto unwahrscheinlicher wird die 
Gleichheit und also die Einheitsbildung gerade dieser 
mit den Qualitaten anderer, desto mehr strecken sie 
sich nach der Dimension der Unvergleichbarkei t hin, 
auf desto niedrigere, primitiv sinnlichere Schichten 
reduziert sich das, womit er sich mit Sicherheit den 
anderen angleichen und mit ihnen eine einheitlich 
charakterisierte Masse formen kann" ( Simmel 1984: 38). 
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What we seem to have, then, are different layers of 
structuration of social interaction, 43 all of which are 
amenable to game-theoretical interpretation. At the 
lowest level, there is the "minimal social order" of 
our thought experiment: In the absence of trustworthy 
expectations, rational actors will follow strategies 
based on generalized caution that minimize the risks, 
as well as the gains, of interaction. At the next 
level, mutual expectations are structured by relative-
ly standardized bridge assumptions regarding actor 
interests and the impact of institutions and social 
norms. These will reduce the need for generalized 
caution by limiting the range of permissible strategy 
choices, and they will permit actors (and researchers) 
to refer to standardized payof f matrices for the game-
theoretical analysis of specific types of interac-
tions. At the third level, finally, ongoing personal 
relations and networks of such relations may so in-
crease empathy and trust among actors that the range 
of interests and motives that can be processed in an 
interaction is significantly enlarged. 
But even though all three layers of structuration seem 
amenable to game-theoretical interpretation, opportu-
nities for empirically valid game-theoretical explana-
tions and predictions seem to differ significantly 
43 A somewhat similar idea was expressed by Uwe 
Schimank who, in his comment on Milgrom/ North /Wein-
gast (1988), distinguished between small-scale social 
order (based on ongoing personal interactions), medi-
um-scale social order (based on reputations depending 
on third-party communication) and large-scale social 
order (depending on mass · media). That does not, howev-
er, seem to exhaust the order-creating potential of 
institutions and social norms. 
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among these levels. Least problematical, perhaps, are 
the conditions of generalized caution. Actors' own 
knowledge is often reduced to (worst-case) estimates 
of each other's capabilities; and given their lack of 
mutual trust, they are unlikely to interact unless 
some salient interest of their own is in fact at 
stake. Thus their perceptions of each other, their own 
payoffs, and their solution concepts should be fairly 
easy to reconstruct from data that, in principle, are 
accessible to empirical or historical research. This 
explains the relative success of game~theoretical 
explanations under conditions of international tension 
and crisis (Snyder/ Diesing 1977). 
More research effort is required in situations of the 
second type where socially constructed bridge assump-
tions are dominant. Nevertheless, the institutional 
structuring of interactions is likely to be quite 
compelling and relatively easy to ascertain at the 
level of permissible strategies. At the level of 
payoffs, however, researchers will have to cope with 
local variations, and with the coexistence of the 
different types of criteria discussed above: individu-
al or organizational self-interest, ethical or func-
tion-related norms of appropriateness, and specific 
interaction orientations. Yet it is likely that one of 
these concerns will be domi·nant in a particular si tua-
tion, and in any case the criteria are socially de-
fined, so that their meaning will often be common 
knowledge within a wider community that includes the 
researcher as well. 
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Even more difficult to obtain are empirically-grounded 
explanations of interactions embedded in ongoing 
personal relations or in "relational contracts" among 
firms and other corporate actors (Macneil 1980). The 
degree of mutual trust that is facilitated by a common 
history, and an expected common future, reduces infor-
mation costs among actors and facilitates a degree of 
openness and empathy that is unattainable in single-
shot encounters and arms-length relationships. Their 
higher degree of empathy permits actors to introduce 
idiosyncratic concerns, and to fine-tune their mutual 
expectations in such a way that games of potentially 
much higher "profitability" can be played. 
By the same token, however, information costs for the 
researcher must sharply increase since perceptions and 
valuations of actors engaged in ongoing relations are 
much more difficult to capture, and are easily miscon-
strued when standard bridge assumptions are applied. 
Ironically, therefore, while high-empathy interactions 
will most closely approximate the theoretical ideal of 
complete-information games, they are the ones whose 
game-theoretical explanation will require the greatest 
empirical effort, and is most likely to fail for lack 
of adequate empirical data. But that, it should be 
noted, is a problem of all social-science research 
dealing with highly individualized social interac-
tions. It becomes more painfully visible here only 
because game theory could, in principle, provide more 
powerful theoretical tools for the analysis of such 
interactions. 
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On the whole, however, this essay ends on an optimis-
tic note: Game theory is clearly a powerful tool for 
the disciplined theoretical analysis of interacting 
choices. 44 However, its analytical power is dependent 
on seemingly unrealistic assumptions about actors' 
common knowledge of strategies and payof f s . What I 
have tried to show is that actors are, in principle, 
able to cope with these informational demands by 
either resorting to strategies of generalized caution, 
or by using institutional rules and social norms for 
their orientation, or finally by creating the condi-
tions for an individualistic construction of common 
knowledge through credible communications which are 
embedded in networks of ongoing relationships. I also 
have tried to show that game-theoretical research may 
profit from bridge assumptions in the reconstruction 
of norm-oriented choices, while research on interac-
tions embedded in ongoing relationships will inevita-
bly face very high information costs - which are, 
however, no higher than those encountered by other 
approaches. What still remains to be discussed are the 
problems of over-complexity arising from the connect-
edness of games, which will be the subject of a subse-
quent paper. 
44 Competitors that come to mind are transaction-
al analysis in psychology and symbolic interactionism 
i n sociology. 
60 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
Bibliography 
Abel, Theodore, 1948: The Operation Called Verstehen. 
In: American Journal of Sociology 54, reprinted in 
Hans Albert, ed., Theorie und Realitat. Ausgewahlte 
Auf satze zur Wissenschaftslehre der Sozialwissen-
schaften. Tilbingen: Mohr (1964), 177-188. 
Akerlof, George A., 1980: A Theory of Social Custom, 
of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence. In: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 749-775. 
Alt, James E./ Randall L. Calvert/ Brian D. Humes, 
1988: Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis. In: American Political Science 
Review 82, 445-466. 
Axelrod, Robert, 1984: The Evolution of Cooperation. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Axelrod, Robert, 1986: An Evolutionary Approach to 
Norms. In: American Political Science Review 80, 
1095-1111. 
Banfield, Edward C., 1958: The Moral Basis of a Back-
ward Society. New York: Free Press. 
Barber, Bernard, 1983: The Logic and Limits of Trust. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Binmore, K.G., 1987: Why Game Theory "Doesn't Work". 
In: P.G. Bennett (ed.), Analysing Conflict and its 
Resolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 23-42. 
Blalock, Hubert M., Jr., 1989: The Real and Unrealized 
Contributions of Quantitative Sociology. In: Ameri-
can Sociological Review 54, 447-460. 
Boudon, Raymond, 1983: Individual Action and Social 
Change: a No-theory of Social Change. In: British 
Journal of Sociology 34, 1-18. 
Brams, Steven J., 1985: Superpower Games. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Burns, Tom R., 1989: Notes: Toward a Sociological 
Theory of Games and Social Behavior. Ms. Uppsala 
University. 
Burns, Tom R. I Helena Flam, 1987: The Shaping of 
Social Organizations. Social Rule System Theory 
with Applications. London: Sage. 
Calvert, Randall L., 1987: Reputation and Legislative 
Leadership. In: Public Choice 55, 81-99. 
Scharpf: The Problem of Complete Information 61 
Coleman, James S., 1986: Micro Foundations and Macro-
social Theory. In: Siegwart Lindenberg/ James S. 
Coleman/ Stefan Nowak, eds., Approaches to Social 
Theory. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 345-367. 
Colman, Andrew M., 1982: Game Theory and Experimental 
Garnes. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Crozier, Michel, 1976: Comparing Structures and Com-
paring Games. In: Geert Hofstede/ M. Sarni Kassem 
(eds.), European Contributions to Organization 
Theory. Assen: Van Gorkum, 193-207. 
Crozier, Michel/ Erhard Friedberg, 1979: Macht und 
Organisation. Die Zwange kollektiven Handelns. 
Konigstein: Athenaum. First published as "L'Acteur 
et le Systeme". Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1977. 
David, Paul A., 1985: Clio and the Economics of 
QUERTY. In: American Economic History 75, 332-337. 
Denzau, Arthur/ William Riker/ Kenneth Shepsle, 1985: 
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and the 
Home Style. In: American Political Science Review 
79, 1117-1134. 
Eichhorn, Wolfgang, 1982: Diskussionsbeitrag zu Rein-
hard Selten: "Einflihrung in die Theorie der Spiele 
mit unvollstandiger Information". In: Erich Strei~­
ler (ed.), Information in der Wirtschaft. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 149-150. 
Elster, Jon, 1983: Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subver-
sion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press. 
Elster, Jon, 1986: Rational Choice. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Etzioni, Amitai, 1988: The Moral Dimension. Toward a 
New Economics. New York: Free Press. 
Flam, Helena, 1989: Emotional Man: A Third Perspective 
on Collective and Corporate Action. MPIFG Discus-
sion Paper 89/7. Koln: Max-Planck-Institut flir 
Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Fox, John/ Melvin Guyer, 1977: Group Size and Other's 
Strategy in an N-Person Game. In: Journal of Con-
flict Resolution 21, 323-38. 
Frey, Bruno S., 1980: Okonomie als Verhaltenswissen-
schaft. Ansatz, Kritik und europaischer Beitrag. 





MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
James W., 1986: Game Theory with Applica-
to Economics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Fudenberg, Drew/ Eric Maskin, 1986: The Folk Theorem 
in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incom-
plete Information. In: Econometrica 54, 533-554 . 
Granovetter, Mark, 1985: Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. In: Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 91, 481-510. 
Glith, Werner/ Wolfgang Leininger/ Gunter Stephan, 
1988: On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual 
Discussion. Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 
19. Universitat Bielefeld: Zentrum flir Interdiszi-
plinare Forschung. 
Guyer, Melvin/ Anatol Rapoport, 1969: Information 
Effects in Two Mixed-Motive Games. In: Behavioral 
Science 14, 467-482. 
Hamburger, Henry, 1979: Games as Models of Social 
Phenomena. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
Hannan, Michael T./ John Freeman, 1977: The Population 
Ecology of Organizations In: American Journal of 
Sociology 82, 929-964. 
Hannan, Michael T. I John Freeman, 19 84: Structural 
Inertia and Organizational Change. In: American 
Sociological Review 49, 149-164. 
Harsanyi, John C. , 19 6 7-6 8: Games with Incomplete 
Information Played by Bayesian Players. In: Manage-
ment Science 14: 159-182, 320-334, 486-502. 
Harsanyi, John C., 1977: Rational Behavior and Bar-
gaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harsanyi, John C./ Reinhard Selten, 1988: A General 
Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hechter, Michael, 1987: Principles of Group Solidari-
ty. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Heiner, Ronald A., 1983: The Origin of Predictable 
Behavior. In: American Economic Review 73, 560-595. 
Hernes, Gudmund, 1976: Structural Change in Social 
Processes. In: American Journal of Sociology 82, 
513-547. 
Hirschman, Albert O., 1977: The Passions and the 
Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Scharpf: The Problem of Complete Information 63 
Homans, George, 1961: Social Behavior. Its Elementary 
Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Hurwicz, Leonid, 1972: On Informationally Decentral-
ized Systems. In: C.B. McGuire/ Roy Radner (eds.), 
Decision and Organization. A Volume in Honor of 
Jacob Marschak. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 297-336. 
Jervis, Robert, 1978: Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma. In: World Politics 30, 167-214. 
Kahneman, Daniel/ Amos Tversky, 1984: Choices, Values, 
and Frames. In: American Psychologist 39, 341-350. 
Kaysen, Carl, 1952: The Minimax Rule of the Theory of 
Games, and the Choice of Strategies under Condi-
tions of Uncertainty. In: Metroeconomica 4, 5-14. 
Kelley, Harold H./ John W. Thibaut, 1978: Interperson-
al Relations. A Theory of Interdependence. New 
York: John Wiley. 
Kliemt, Hartmut, 1985: Moralische Institutionen. 
Empiristische Theorien ihrer Evolution. Freiburg: 
Karl Alber. 
Kliemt, Hartmut, 1986: Antagonistische Kooperation. 
Elementare spieltheoretische Modelle spontaner 
Ordnungsentstehung. Freiburg: Karl Alber. 
Kreps, David M./ Robert Wilson, 1982: Reputation and 
Imperfect Information. In: Journal of Economic 
Theory 27, 253-279. 
Lasswell, Harold D./ Abraham Kaplan, 1950: Power and 
Society. A Framework for Political Inquiry. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Latsis, Spiros, 1972: Situational Determinism in 
Economics. In: British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 23, 207-245. 
Lindenberg, Siegwart, 1983: The New Political Economy: 
its potential and limitations for the social sci-
ences in general and for sociology in particular. 
In: Walter Soudeur (ed.), Okonomische Erklarungen 
sozialen Verhaltens. Duisburg: Verlag der sozial-
wissenschaftlichen Kooperative, 7-66. 
Lindenberg, Siegwart, 1989: Choice and Culture: The 
Behavioral Basis of Cultural Impact on Transac-
tions. In: Hans Haferkamp (ed.), Social Structure 
and Culture. Berlin: de Gruyter, 175-200. 
64 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
Long, Norton, 1961: The Local Community as an Ecology 
of Games. In: Norton Long, The Polity. Chicago: 
Rand McNally, 139-155. 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1986: Okologische Kommunikation. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
MacCrimmon, Kenneth R. I David M. Messick, 1976: A 
Framework for Social Motives. In: Behavioral Sci-
ence 21, 86-100. 
Macneil, Ian R., 1980: The New Social Contract. An 
Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
March, James G./ Johan P. Olsen, 1989: Rediscovering 
Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. 
New York: Free Press, forthcoming. 
Maslow, Abraham H., 1970: Motivation and Personality. 
Revised Edition. New York: Harper. 
Maynard Smith, John, 1982: Evolution and the Theory 
of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mayntz, Renate/ Thomas P. Hughes (eds.), 1988: The 
Development of Large Technical Systems. Frankfurt: 
Campus. 
McGinnis, Michael D., 1986: Issue Linkage and the 
Evolution of International Cooperation. In: Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 30, 141-170. 
Milgrom, Paul R./ Douglass C. North/ Barry R. Wein-
gast, 1988: Third-Party Enforcement of Norms and 
Contracts: A Theoretical-Historical Analysis. Paper 
prepared for the "Workshop on Connected Games", 
Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, 
Cologne, November 17-18, 1988. 
Malm, Linda D., 1989: Punishment Power: A Balancing 
Process in Power-Dependence Relations. In: American 
Journal of Sociology 94, 1392-1418. 
Neisser, Hans, 1952: The Strategy of Expecting the 
Worst. In: Social Research 19, 346-363. 
Nelson, Richard R./ Sidney G. Winter, 1982: An Evolu-
tionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press. 
Ordeshook, Peter c., 1986: Game Theory and Political 
Theory. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor, 1986: An Agenda for the Study of 
Institutions. In: Public Choice 48, 3-25. 
Scharpf: The Problem of Complete Information 65 
Peterson, Richard A., 1970: Comment: Must the Quest 
After Variance End in History? In: Mayer N. Zald 
(ed.), Power in Organizations. Nashville: Vander-
bilt University Press, 92-96. 
Przeworski, Adam, 1986: Methbdologischer Individualis-
mus als Herausforderung der marxistischen Theorie. 
In: Prokla 62, 120-143. 
Rapoport, Anatol/ Albert M. Chammah, 1965: Prisoner's 
Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1987: A Game-Theoretical Explana-
tion of Inflation and Unemployment in Western 
Europe. In: Journal of Public Policy 7, 227-258. 
Scharpf, Fritz w., 1988: The Joint Decision Trap: 
Lessons from German Federalism and European Inte-
gration. In: Public Administration 66, 239-278. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1989: Decision Rules, Decision 
Styles, and Policy Choices. In: Journal of Theoret-
ical Politics 1, 149-176. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1989a: Der Bundesrat und die Koope-
ration auf der "dri tten Ebene". MPIFG Discussion 
Paper 89/4. Koln: Max-Planck-Institut flir Gesell-
schaftsforschung. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1989b: Politische Steuerung und 
politische Institutionen. In: Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift 30: 10-21. 
Schulz, Ulrich/ Theo May, 1989: The Recording of 
Social Orientations with Ranking and Pair Compari-
son Procedures. In: European Journal of Social 
Psychology 19, 41-59. 
Selten, Reinhard, 1978: The Chain Store Paradox. In: 
Theory and Decision 9, 127-159. 
Selten, Reinhard, 1982: Einflihrung in die Theorie der 
Spiele mit unvollstandiger Information. In: Erich 
StreiJHer (ed. ) , Information in der Wirtschaft. 
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 81-147. 
Selten, Reinhard, 1985: Comment. In: Kenneth J. 
Arrow/ Seppo Honkapohja (eds.), Frontiers of Eco-
nomics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 77-87. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1979: Institutional Arrangements 
and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. 
In: American Journal of Political Science 23: 27-
59. 
66 MPIFG Discussion Paper 89/9 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1989: Studying Institutions: Some 
Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach. In: 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 131-147. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A./ Barry R. Weingast, 1981: Politi-
cal Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generaliza-
tion. In: American Journal of Political Science 25, 
96-111. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A./ Barry R. Weingast, 1987: The 
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. In: 
American Political Science Review 81, 85-104. 
Simmel, Georg, 1984: Grundfragen der Soziologie, 
Individuum und Gesellschaft. 4th edition. Berlin: 
de Gruyter (first edition 1917). 
Simon, Herbert A., 1978: Rationality as Process and 
as Product of Thought. In: American Economic Review 
68, Papers and Proceedings, 1-16. 
Simon, Herbert A., 1986: Rationality in Psychology and 
Economics. In: Journal of Business 59, S209-S224. 
Snyder, Glenn H., 1971: "Prisoners' Dilemma" and 
"Chicken" Models in International Poli ties. In: 
International Studies Quarterly 15, 66-103. 
Snyder, Glenn H./ Paul Diesing, 1977: Conflict among 
Nations. Bargaining, Decision Making, and System 
Structure in International Crises. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Taylor, Michael, 1987: The Possibility of Cooperation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Trockel, Walter, 1986: The Chain-Store Paradox Revis-
ited. In: Theory and Decision 21, 163-79. 
Tsebelis, George, 1988a: Nested Games: Political 
Context, Political Institutions, and Rationality. 
Book Manuscript. Los Angeles: Department of Politi-
cal Science, UCLA. 
Tullock, Gordon, 1985: Adam Smith and the Prisoners' 
Dilemma. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics C, 
Supplement, 1073-1081. 
Tversky, Amos/ Daniel Kahneman, 1986: Rational Choice 
and the Framing of Decisions. In: Journal of Busi-
ness 59, S251-S278. 
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 1977: The Evolution of Norms. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 1978: Invisible-Hand Explana-
tions. In: Synthese 39: 263-291. 
Scharpf: The Problem of Complete Information 67 
Ward, Hugh, 1987: The Risks of a Reputation for Tough-
ness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision Problems 
Modelled by Chicken Supergames. In: British Journal 
of Political Science 17, 23-52. 
Witt, Ulrich, 1986: Evolution and Stability of Cooper-
ation without Enforceable Contracts. In: Kyklos 39, 
245-266. 
Zintl, Reinhard, 1989: Der Homo Oeconomicus: Ausnahme-
erscheinung in jeder Situation oder Jedermann in 
Ausnahmesituationen? In: Analyse & Kritik, forth-
coming. 
